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Abstract
This paper establishes inner bounds on the secrecy capacity regions for the general 3-receiver broadcast channel
with one common and one confidential message sets. We consider two setups. The first is when the confidential
message is to be sent to two receivers and kept secret from the third receiver. Achievability is established using
indirect decoding, Wyner wiretap channel coding, and the new idea of generating secrecy from a publicly available
superposition codebook. The inner bound is shown to be tight for a class of reversely degraded broadcast channels
and when both legitimate receivers are less noisy than the third receiver. The second setup investigated in this paper is
when the confidential message is to be sent to one receiver and kept secret from the other two receivers. Achievability
in this case follows from Wyner wiretap channel coding and indirect decoding. This inner bound is also shown to be
tight for several special cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wiretap channel was first introduced in the seminal paper by Wyner [1]. He considered a 2-receiver broadcast
channel where sender X wishes to communicate a message to receiver Y while keeping it secret from the other
receiver (eavesdropper) Z . Wyner showed that the secrecy capacity when the channel to the eavesdropper is a
degraded version of the channel to the legitimate receiver is
Cs = max
p(x)
(I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)).
The main coding idea is to randomly generate 2n(I(X:Y )) xn sequences and partition them into 2nR message bins,
where R < I(X ;Y ) − I(X ;Z). To send a message, a sequence from the message bin is randomly selected and
transmitted. The legitimate receiver uniquely decodes the codeword and hence the message with high probability,
while the message is kept asymptotically secret from the eavesdropper provided R < CS.
This result was extended by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [2] to general (non-degraded) 2-receiver broadcast channels with
common and confidential messages. They established the secrecy capacity region, which is the optimal tradeoff
between the common and private message rates and the eavesdropper’s private message equivocation rate. In the
special case of no common message, their result yields the secrecy capacity for the general wiretap channel,
Cs = max
p(v)p(x|v)
(I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)).
The achievability idea is to use Wyner’s wiretap channel coding for the channel from V to Y by randomly
selecting a vn codeword from the message bin and then sending a random sequence Xn generated according
to
∏n
i=1 pX|V (xi|vi).
The work in [2] has been extended in several directions by considering different message demands and secrecy
scenarios, e.g., see [3], [4]. However, with some notable exceptions such as [5] and [6], extending the result of Csisza´r
and Ko¨rner to general discrete memoryless broadcast channels with more than two receivers has remained open, since
even the capacity region without secrecy constraints for the 3-receiver broadcast channel with degraded message
sets is not known in general. The secrecy setup for the 3-receiver broadcast channel also has close connections
to the compound wiretap channel model (see [7, Chapter 3] and references therein). Recently, Nair and El Gamal
[8] showed that the straightforward extension of the Ko¨rner–Marton capacity region for the 2-receiver broadcast
channel with degraded message sets to more than 3 receivers is not optimal. They established an achievable rate
region for the general 3-receiver broadcast channel and showed that it can be strictly larger than the straightforward
extension of the Ko¨rner–Marton region.
In this paper, which is a much expanded version of [9], we establish inner and outer bounds on the secrecy
capacity region for the 3-receivers broadcast channel with common and confidential messages. We consider two
setups.
• 2-receiver, 1-eavesdropper: Here the confidential message is to be sent to two receivers and kept secret from
the third receiver (eavesdropper).
• 1-receiver, 2-eavesdroppers: In this setup the confidential message is to be sent to one receiver and kept secret
from the other two receivers.
To illustrate the main coding idea in our new inner bound for the 2-receiver, 1-eavesdropper setup, consider the
special case where a message M ∈ [1 : 2nR] is to be sent reliably to receivers Y1 and Y2 and kept asymptotically
secret from eavesdropper Z . A straightforward extension of the Csisza´r–Ko¨rner [2] result for the 2-receiver wiretap
channel yields the lower bound on the secrecy capacity
CS ≥ max
p(v)p(x|v)
min{I(V ;Y1)− I(V ;Z), I(V ;Y2)− I(V ;Z)}. (1)
Now, suppose Z is a degraded version of Y1, then from Wyner’s wiretap result, we know that (I(V ;Y1)−I(V ;Z)) ≤
(I(X ;Y1)− I(X ;Z)) for all p(v, x). However, no such inequality holds in general for the second term under the
minimum. As a special case of the inner bound in Theorem 1, we show that the rate obtained by replacing V by
X only in the first term in (1) is achievable, that is, we establish the lower bound
CS ≥ max
p(v)p(x|v)
min{I(X ;Y1)− I(X ;Z), I(V ;Y2)− I(V ;Z)}. (2)
To prove achievability of (2), we again randomly generate 2n(I(V ;Y2)−δ) vn sequences and partition them into
2nR bins, where R = (I(V ;Y2)− I(V ;Z)). For each vn sequence, we randomly and conditionally independently
generate 2nI(X;Z|V ) xn sequences. The vn and xn sequences are revealed to all parties, including the eavesdropper.
To send a message m, the encoder randomly chooses a vn sequence from bin m. It then randomly chooses an
xn sequence from the codebook for the selected vn sequence (instead of randomly generating an Xn sequence as
in the Csisza´r–Ko¨rner scheme) and transmits it. Receiver Y2 decodes vn directly, while receiver Y1 decodes vn
indirectly through xn [8]. In Section III, we show through an example that this new lower bound can be strictly
larger than the extended Csisza´r–Ko¨rner lower bound. We then show in Theorem 1 that this lower bound can be
generalized further via Marton coding.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present needed definitions. In Section III, we
provide an alternative proof of achievability for the Csisza´r–Ko¨rner 2-receiver wiretap channel that uses superposition
coding and random codeword selection instead of random generating of the transmitted codeword. This technique
is used in subsequent sections to establish the new inner bounds for the 3-receiver setups. In Section IV, we present
the inner bound for the 2-receiver, 1-eavesdropper case. We show that this lower bound is tight for the reversely
degraded product broadcast channel and when the eavesdropper is less noisy than both legitimate receivers. In
Section V, we present inner and outer bounds for the 1-receiver, 2-eavesdropper setup for 3-receiver multilevel
broadcast channel [10]. We show that the bounds coincide in several special cases.
II. DEFINITIONS AND PROBLEM SETUP
Consider a 3-receiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel with input alphabet X , output alphabets Y1,Y2,Y3
and conditional pmfs p(y1, y2, y3|x). We investigate the following two setups.
A. 2-Receivers, 1-Eavesdropper
Here the confidential message is to be sent to receivers Y1 and Y2 and is to be kept secret from the eavesdropper
Y3 = Z). A (2nR0 , 2nR1 , n) code for this scenario consists of: (i) two messages (M0,M1) uniformly distributed
over [1 : 2nR0 ] × [1 : 2nR1 ]; (ii) an encoder that randomly generates a codeword Xn(m0,m1) according to the
conditional pmf p(xn|m0,m1); and (iii) 3 decoders; the first decoder assigns to each received sequence yn1 an
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estimate (Mˆ01, Mˆ11) ∈ [1 : 2nR0 ] × [1 : 2nR1 ] or an error message, the second decoder assigns to each received
sequence yn2 an estimate (Mˆ02, Mˆ12) ∈ [1 : 2nR0 ]× [1 : 2nR1 ] or an error message, and the third decoder assigns
to each received sequence zn an estimate Mˆ03 ∈ [1 : 2nR0 ] or an error message. The probability of error for this
scenario is defined as
P
(n)
e1 = P
{
Mˆ0j 6= M0for j = 1, 2, 3or Mˆ1j 6= M1for j = 1, 2
}
.
The equivocation rate at receiver Z , which measures the amount of uncertainty receiver Z has about message M1,
is defined as H(M1|Zn)/n.
A secrecy rate tuple (R0, R1, Re) is said to be achievable if
lim
n→∞
P
(n)
e1 = 0, and
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H(M1|Z
n) ≥ Re.
The secrecy capacity region is the closure of the set of achievable rate tuples (R0, R1, Re).
For this setup, we also consider the special case of asymptotic perfect secrecy, where no common message is to
be sent to Z and a confidential message, M ∈ [1 : 2nR], is to be sent to Y1 and Y2 only. The probability of error
is as defined above with R0 = 0 and R1 = R. A secrecy rate R is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence
of (2nR, n) codes such that
lim
n→∞
P
(n)
e1 = 0, and
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H(M |Zn) ≥ R.
The secrecy capacity, CS , is the supremum of all achievable rates.
B. 1-Receiver, 2-Eavesdroppers
In this setup, the confidential message is to be sent to receiver Y1 and kept secret from eavesdroppers Y2 = Z2 and
Y3 = Z3. A (2nR0 , 2nR1 , n) code consists of the same message sets and encoding function as in the 2-receiver, 1-
eavesdropper case. The first decoder assigns to each received sequence yn1 an estimate (Mˆ01, Mˆ1) ∈ [1 : 2nR0 ]× [1 :
2nR1 ] or an error message, the second decoder assigns to each received sequence zn2 an estimate Mˆ02 ∈ [1 : 2nR0 ]
or an error message, and the third decoder assigns to each received sequence zn3 an estimate Mˆ03 ∈ [1 : 2nR0 ] or
an error message. The probability of error is
P
(n)
e2 = P{Mˆ0j 6= M0for j = 1, 2, 3or Mˆ1 6= M1}.
The equivocation rates at the two eavesdroppers are H(M1|Zn2 )/n and H(M1|Zn3 )/n, respectively.
A secrecy rate tuple (R0, R1, Re2, Re3) is said to be achievable if
lim
n→∞
P
(n)
e2 = 0,
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H(M1|Z
n
j ) ≥ Rej , j = 2, 3.
The secrecy capacity region is the closure of the set of achievable rate tuples (R0, R1, Re2, Re3). For simplicity of
presentation, we consider only the special class of multilevel broadcast channels [10].
III. 2-RECEIVER WIRETAP CHANNEL
We first revisit the 2-receiver wiretap channel, where a confidential message is to be sent to the legitimate receiver
Y and kept secret from the eavesdropper Z . The secrecy capacity for this case is a special case of the secrecy
capacity region for the broadcast channel with common and confidential messages established in [2].
Proposition 1: The secrecy capacity of the 2-receiver wiretap channel is
CS = max
p(v,x)
(I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)).
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In the following, we provide a new proof of achievability for this result in which the second randomization step
in the original proof is replaced by a random codeword selection from a public superposition codebook. As we
will see, this proof technique allows us to use indirect decoding to establish new inner bounds for the 3-receiver
wiretap channels.
Proof of Achievability for Proposition 1:
Fix p(v, x). Randomly and independently generate sequences vn(l0), l0 ∈ [1 : 2nR˜], each according to
∏n
i=1 pV (vi).
Partition the set [1 : 2nR˜] into 2nR bins B(m) = [(m − 1)2n(R˜−R) + 1 : m2n(R˜−R)], m ∈ [1 : 2nR]. For each
l0 ∈ [1 : 2nR˜], randomly and conditionally independently generate sequences xn(l0, l1), l1 ∈ [1 : 2nR˜1 ], each
according to
∏n
i=1 pX|V (xi|vi). The codebook {(vn(l0), xn(l0, l1))} is revealed to all parties. To send the message
m, an index L0 ∈ B(m) is selected uniformly at random (as in Wyner’s original proof). The encoder then randomly
and independently selects an index L1 and transmits xn(L0, L1). Receiver Y decodes L0 by finding the unique
index lˆ0 such that (vn(lˆ0), yn) ∈ T (n)ǫ . By the law of large numbers and the packing lemma [11, Chapter 3], the
average probability of error approaches zero as n→∞ if R˜ < (V ;Y )− δ(ǫ).
We now show that I(M ;Zn|C) ≤ nδ(ǫ). Considering the mutual information between Zn and M , averaged over
the random codebook C, we have
I(M ;Zn|C) = I(M,L0, L1;Z
n|C)− I(L0, L1;Z
n|M, C)
(a)
≤ I(Xn;Zn|C)−H(L0, L1|M, C) +H(L0, L1|M,Z
n, C)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Zi|C)− n(R˜−R)− nR˜1 +H(L0, L1|M,Z
n, C)
≤ nI(X ;Z)− n(R˜+ R˜1 −R) +H(L0|M,Z
n, C) +H(L1|L0, Z
n, C). (3)
(a) follows since (M,L0, L1, C) → Xn → Zn from the discrete memoryless property of the channel. The last
step follows from follows since H(Zi|C) ≤ H(Zi) = H(Z) and H(Zi|Xi, C) =
∑
C p(C)p(xi|C)H(Z|xi, C) =∑
C p(C)p(vi|C)H(Z|xi) = H(Z|X) It remains to upper bound H(L0|M,Zn, C) and H(L1|L0, Zn, C). By sym-
metry of codebook construction, we have
H(L0|M,Z
n, C) = 2−nR
2nR∑
m=1
H(L0|M = m,Z
n, C)
= H(L0|Z
n,M = 1, C),
H(L1|L0, Z
n, C) = 2−nR˜
∑
l0
H(L1|L0 = l0, Z
n, C)
= H(L1|L0 = 1, v
n(1), Zn, C).
To further bound these terms, we use the following key lemma.
Lemma 1: Let (U, V, Z) ∼ p(u, v, z), S ≥ 0 and ǫ > 0. Let Un be a random sequence distributed according to∏n
i=1 pU (ui). Let V
n(l), l ∈ [1 : 2nS ], be a set of random sequences that are conditionally independent given Un
and each distributed according to
∏n
i=1 pV |U (vi|ui), and let C = {Un, V n(l)}. Let L ∈ [1 : 2nS ] be a random index
with an arbitrary probability mass. Then, if P{(Un, V n(L), Zn) ∈ T (n)ǫ } → 1 as n→∞ and S ≥ I(V ;Z|U)+δ(ǫ),
there exists a δ′(ǫ) > 0, where δ′(ǫ)→ 0 as ǫ→ 0, such that, for n sufficiently large,
H(L|Zn, Un, C) ≤ n(S − I(V ;Z|U)) + nδ′(ǫ).
The proof of this lemma is given in Appendix I. An illustration of the random sequence structure is given in
Figure 1.
Now, returning to (3), we note that P{(V n(L0), Xn(L0, L1), Zn) ∈ T (n)ǫ } → 1 as n → ∞ by law of large
numbers. Hence, we can apply Lemma 1 to obtain
H(L0|Z
n,M = 1, C) ≤ n((R˜ −R)− I(V ;Z)) + nδ(ǫ), (4)
H(L1|L0 = 1, V
n, Zn, C) ≤ n(R˜1 − I(X ;Z|V )) + nδ(ǫ), (5)
4
PSfrag replacements
U
n
Z
n
V n(1) V n(2) V n(2nS)V n(L)
Fig. 1: Structure of random sequences in Lemma 1. V n(l) is generated according to
∏n
i=1 pV |U (vi|ui). Solid arrows
represent the sequence pair (Un, V n(L), Zn) while the dotted arrows to Zn represent the other V n sequences jointly
typical with the (Un, Zn) pair. Lemma 1 gives an upper bound on the number of V n sequences that can be jointly
typical with a (Un, Zn) pair.
if R˜−R ≥ I(V ;Z) + δ(ǫ) and R˜1 ≥ I(X ;Z|V ) + δ(ǫ). Substituting from inequalities (4) and (5) into (3) shows
that I(M ;Zn|C) ≤ 2nδ(ǫ). We then recover the original asymptotic secrecy rate by noting that the constraint of
R˜1 ≥ I(X ;Z|V ) is not tight. This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Remark 3.1: In the proof of Proposition 1 in [2], the encoder transmits a randomly generated codeword Xn ∼∏n
i=1 pX|V (xi|vi). Although replacing random Xn generation by superposition coding and random codeword
selection in our alternative proof does not increase the achievable secrecy rate for the 2-receiver wiretap channel,
it can increase the rate when there are more than one legitimate receiver, as we show in the next sections.
IV. 2-RECEIVERS, 1-EAVESDROPPER WIRETAP CHANNEL
We establish an inner bound on the secrecy capacity for the 3-receiver wiretap channel with one common and
one confidential message when the confidential message is to be sent to receivers Y1 and Y2 and kept secret from
receiver Z . In the following subsection, we consider the case where M0 = ∅ and M1 = M ∈ [1 : 2nR] is to be
kept asymptotically secret from Z . This result is then extended in Subsection IV-B to establish an inner bound on
the secrecy capacity region.
A. Asymptotic perfect secrecy
We establish the following lower bound on secrecy capacity for the case where a confidential message is to be
sent to receivers Y1 and Y2 and kept secret from the eavesdropper Z .
Theorem 1: The secrecy capacity of the 2-receiver, 1-eavesdropper setup with one confidential message and
asymptotic secrecy is lower bounded as follows
CS ≥ min{I(V0, V1;Y1|Q)− I(V0, V1;Z|Q), I(V0, V2;Y2|Q)− I(V0, V2;Z|Q)}
for some p(q, v0, v1, v2, x) = p(q, v0)p(v1, v2|v0)p(x|v1, v2, v0) such that I(V1, V2;Z|V0) ≤ I(V1;Z|V0)+I(V2;Z|V0)−
I(V1;V2|V0).
In addition to superposition coding and the new coding idea discussed in the previous section, Theorem 1 also uses
Marton coding [12].
For clarity, we first establish the following Corollary 1.
Corollary 1: The secrecy capacity for the 2-receiver, 1-eavesdropper with one confidential message and asymp-
totic secrecy is lower bounded as follows
CS ≥ max
p(q)p(v|q)p(x|v)
min{I(X ;Y1|Q)− I(X ;Z|Q), I(V ;Y2|Q)− I(V ;Z|Q)}.
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Remark 4.1: Consider the case where X → Y1 → Z form a Markov chain. Then, we can show that Theorem 1
reduces to Corollary 1, i.e., the achievable secrecy rate is not increased by using Marton coding when X → Y1 → Z
(or X → Y2 → Z by symmetry) form a Markov chain. To see this, note that (I(X ;Y1|Q) − I(X ;Z|Q)) ≥
(I(V1, V0;Y1|Q) − I(V1, V0;Z|Q)) for all V1 if X → Y1 → Z . Next, note that we can set V = (V0, V2) in
Corollary 1 to obtain the rate in Theorem 1.
Proof of Corollary 1:
Codebook generation: Randomly and independently generate the time-sharing sequence qn according to
∏n
i=1 pQ(qi).
Next, randomly and conditionally independently generate 2nR˜ sequences vn(l0), l0 ∈ [1 : 2nR˜], each according
to
∏n
i=1 pV |Q(vi|qi). Partition the set [1 : 2nR˜] into 2nR equal size bins B(m), m ∈ [1 : 2nR]. For each l0,
conditionally independently generate sequences xn(l0, l1), l1 ∈ [1 : 2nR˜1 ], each according to
∏n
i=1 pX|V (xi|vi).
Encoding: To send a message m ∈ [1 : 2nR], randomly and independently choose an index L0 ∈ C(m) and an
index L1 ∈ [1 : 2nR˜1 ], and send xn(L0, L1).
Decoding: Assume without loss of generality that L0 = 1 and m = 1. Receiver Y2 finds L0, and hence m, via
joint typicality decoding. By the law of large number and the packing lemma, the probability of error approaches
zero as n→∞ if
R˜ < I(V ;Y2|Q)− δ(ǫ).
Receiver Y1 finds L0 (and hence m) via indirect decoding. That is, it declares that Lˆ0 is sent if it is the unique
index such that (qn, vn(Lˆ0), xn(Lˆ0, l1), Y n1 ) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ for some l1 ∈ [1 : 2nR˜1 ]. To analyze the average probability
of error P(E), define the error events
E10 = {(Q
n, Xn(1, 1), Y n1 ) /∈ T
(n)
ǫ },
E11 = {(Q
n, Xn(l0, l1), Y
n
1 ) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ for some l0 6= 1}.
Then, by union of events bound the probability of error is upper bounded as
P(E) ≤ P{E10}+ P{E11}.
Now by law of large numbers, P{E10} → 0 as n→∞. Next consider
P{E11} ≤
∑
l0 6=1
∑
l1
P{(Qn, V n(l0), X
n(l0, l1), Y
n
1 ) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ }
≤
∑
l0 6=1
∑
l1
2−n(I(V,X;Y1|Q)−δ(ǫ))
≤ 2n(R˜+R˜1−I(V,X;Y1|Q)+δ(ǫ)).
Hence, P{E11} → 0 as n→∞ if
R˜+ R˜1 < I(X ;Y1|Q)− δ(ǫ).
Analysis of equivocation rate: To bound the equivocation rate term H(M |Zn, C), we proceed as before and show
that the I(M ;Zn|C) ≤ 2nδ(ǫ). Note that the only difference between this case and the analysis for the 2-receiver
case in Section II is the addition of the time-sharing random variable Q. Since
P{(Qn, V n(L0), Xn(L0, L1), Zn) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ } → 1 as n→∞, we can apply Lemma 1 (with the addition of the time
sharing random variable). Following the analysis in Section II, it is easy to see that I(M ;Zn|C) ≤ 2nδ(ǫ) if
R˜−R ≥ I(V ;Z|Q) + δ(ǫ),
R˜1 ≥ I(X ;Z|V ) + δ(ǫ).
Finally, using Fourier–Motzkin elimination on the set of inequalities completes the proof of achievability.
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Before proving Theorem 1, we show through an example that the lower bound in Corollary 1 can be strictly
larger than the rate of the straightforward extension of the Csisza´r–Ko¨rner scheme to the 2-receiver, 1-eavesdropper
setting,
RCK = max
p(q)p(v|q)p(x|v)
min{I(V ;Y1|Q)− I(V ;Z|Q), I(V ;Y2|Q)− I(V ;Z|Q)}.. (6)
Note that Theorem 1 includes RCK as a special case (through setting V0 = V1 = V2 = V in Theorem 1).
Example: Consider the multilevel product broadcast channel example [8] in Figure 2, where X1 = X2 = Y12 =
Y21 = {0, 1}, and Y11 = Z1 = Z2 = {0, E, 1}. The channel conditional probabilities are specified in Figure 2.
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Fig. 2: Multilevel broadcast channel
In Appendix II, we show that RCK < 5/6. In contrast, using Corollary 1, we can achieve a rate of 5/6, which
shows that the rate given in Theorem 1 can be strictly larger than using the straightforward extension of the
Csisza´r–Ko¨rner scheme.
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 1, which utilizes Marton coding in addition to the ideas already introduced.
Proof of Theorem 1:
Codebook generation: Randomly and independently generate a time-sharing sequence qn according to
∏n
i=1 pQ(qi).
Randomly and conditionally independently generate sequences vn0 (l0), l0 ∈ [1 : 2nR˜], each according to
∏n
i=1 pV0|Q(v0i|qi).
Partition the set [1 : 2nR˜] into 2nR bins, B(m), m ∈ [1 : 2nR] as before. For each l0, randomly and conditionally
independently generate sequences vn1 (l0, t1), t1 ∈ [1 : 2nT1 ], each according to
∏n
i=1 pV1|V0(v1i|v0i). Partition the
set [1 : 2nT1 ] into 2nR˜1 equal size bins, B(l0, l1). Similarly, for each l0, generate sequences vn2 (l0, t2), t2 ∈ [1 : 2nT2 ],
each according to
∏n
i=1 pV2|V0(v2i|v0i), and partition [1 : 2nT1 ] into 2nR˜2 equal size bins, B(l0, l2). Finally, for each
product bin B(l0, l1)× B(l0, l2), find a jointly typical sequence pair (vn1 (l0, t1(l0, l1)), vn2 (l0, t2(l0, l2)). If there is
more than one such pair, randomly and uniformly pick one of them. This encoding step succeeds with probability
of error that approaches zero as n→∞, if [13]
R˜1 + R˜2 < T1 + T2 − I(V1;V2|V0)− δ(ǫ).
Encoding: To send message m, the encoder first randomly chooses an index L0 ∈ B(m). It then randomly chooses
a product bin indices (L1, L2) and selects the jointly typical sequence pair
(vn1 (L0, t1(L0, L1)), v
n
2 (L0, t2(L0, L2)). Finally, the encoder generates a codeword Xn at random according to∏n
i=1 pX|V0,V1,V2(xi|v0i, v1i, v2i) and transmits it.
Decoding and analysis of the probability of error: Receiver Y1 decodes L0 and hence m indirectly by finding
the unique index lˆ0 such that (vn0 (lˆ0), vn1 (lˆ0, t1), yn1 ) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ for some t1 ∈ [1 : 2nT1 ]. Similarly, receiver Y2
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finds L0 (and hence m) indirectly by finding the unique index lˆ0 such that (vn0 (lˆ0), vn2 (lˆ0, T2)) ∈ T (n)ǫ for some
l2 ∈ [1 : 2nT2 ]. Following the analysis given earlier, it is easy to see that these steps succeed with probability of
error that approaches zero as n→∞ if
R˜+ T1 < I(V0, V1;Y1|Q)− δ(ǫ),
R˜+ T2 < I(V0, V1;Y2|Q)− δ(ǫ).
Analysis of equivocation rate: A codebook C induces a joint pmf on (M,L0, L1, L2, V n0 , V n1 , V n2 , Zn) of the form
p(m, l0, l1, l2, v
n
0 , v
n
1 , v
n
2 z
n|c) = 2−n(R˜+R˜1+R˜2)p(vn0 , v
n
1 , v
n
2 |l0, l1, l2, c)
∏n
i=1 pZ|V0,V1,V2(zi|v0i, v1i, v2i). We again
analyze the mutual information between M and (Zn, Qn), averaged over codebooks.
I(M ;Zn, Qn|C) = I(M ;Zn|Qn, C)
= I(T1(L0, L1), T2(L0, L1), L0,M ;Z
n|Qn, C)
− I(T1(L0, L1), T2(L0, L2), L0;Z
n|M,Qn, C)
≤ I(V n0 , V
n
1 , V
n
2 ;Z
n|Qn, C)− I(L0;Z
n|M,Qn, C)
− I(T1(L0, L1), T2(L0, L2);Z
n|L0, Q
n, C)
≤ nI(V0, V1, V2;Z|Q)−H(L0|M,Q
n, C) +H(L0|M,Q
n, Zn, C)
− I(T1(L0, L1), T2(L0, L2);Z
n|L0, Q
n, C) + nδ(ǫ). (7)
In the last step, we bound the term I(V n0 , V n1 , V n2 ;Zn|Qn, C) by the following argument, which is an extension of a
similar argument in [1]. For simplicity of notation, let V = (V0, V1, V2). We wish to show that I(V n;Zn|Qn, C) ≤
nI(V ;Z) + nδ(ǫ). Note that X is generated according to p(xi|vi). Define E = 1 if (qn, vn, zn) are not jointly
typical and 0 otherwise, and N(v) = |{Vi : Vi = v}|. Then,
I(V n;Zn|C, Qn) ≤ 1 + P(E = 0)I(V ;Zn|C, E = 0, Qn) + P(E = 1)I(V ;Zn|C, E = 1, Qn)
≤ 1 + P(E = 0)I(V ;Zn|C, E = 0, Qn)
+ P(E = 1)n log |Z| − P(E = 1)H(Zn|C, V n, Qn, E = 1)
= 1 + P(E = 0)(H(Zn|C, E = 0, Qn)−H(Zn|C, V n, Qn) + P(E = 1)n log |Z|.
Note that H(Zn|C, E = 0, Qn) ≤ nH(Z|Q) + nδ(ǫ). For H(Zn|C, V n, Qn, E = 0) = H(Zn|C, V n, E = 0), we
have
H(Zn|C, E = 0, V n) ≥
∑
c,vn∈T
(n)
ǫ
P(V n = vn, C = c)H(Zn|C = c, V n = vn)
=
∑
c,vn∈T
(n)
ǫ
P(V n = vn, C = c)
n∑
i=1
H(Zi|C = c, V
n = vn, Zi−1)
(a)
=
∑
c,vn∈T
(n)
ǫ
P(V n = vn, C = c)
n∑
i=1
H(Zi|Vi = vi)
=
∑
c,vn∈T
(n)
ǫ
P(V n = vn, C = c)
∑
v∈V
N(v)H(Z|V = v)
(b)
≥
∑
c,vn∈T
(n)
ǫ
P(V n = vn, C = c)
(∑
v∈V
n(p(v)− δ(ǫ))H(Z|V = v)
)
≥ nH(Z|V )− nδ′(ǫ),
where (a) follows since given Vi, Xi is generated randomly according to p(xi|vi) and since the channel is
memoryless, Zi is independent of all other random variables, and (b) follows since vn is typical, which implies that
N(v) ≥ np(v)− nδ(ǫ). Finally, since the coding scheme satisfies the encoding constraints, the proof is completed
by noting that P(E = 1) → 0 as n → ∞ by the law of large numbers and the mutual covering lemma in [11,
Chapter 9]).
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We now bound each remaining terms in inequality (7) separately. Note that
H(L0|M,Q
n, C) = n(R˜−R), (8)
H(L0|M,Q
n, Zn, C)
(a)
≤ n(S0 −R− I(V0;Z|Q) + δ(ǫ)), (9)
where (a) follows by similar steps to the proof of Corollary 1 and application of Lemma 1, which holds if
P{(Qn, V n0 (L0), Z
n) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ } → 1 as n→∞ and S0 −R ≥ I(V0;Z|Q). The first condition follows since
P{(Qn, V n0 (L0), V
n
1 (L0, T1(L0, L1)), V
n
2 (L0, T2(L0, L2)), Z
n) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ } → 1 as n→∞. Next, consider
I(T1(L0, L1), T2(L0, L2);Z
n|L0, Q
n, C)
= H(T1(L0, L1), T2(L0, L2)|L0, Q
n, C)−H(T1(L0, L1), T2(L0, L2)|L0, Q
n, Zn, C)
(a)
= H(L1, L2|L0, Q
n, C)−H(T1(L0, L1), T2(L0, L2)|L0, Q
n, Zn, C)
≥ H(L1, L2|L0, Q
n, C)−H(T1(L0, L1)|L0, Q
n, Zn, C)−H(T2(L0, L2)|L0, Q
n, Zn, C), (10)
where (a) holds since given the codebook C and L0, (T1, T2) is a one-to-one function of (L1, L2). Now,
H(L1, L2|L0, Q
n, C) = n(R˜1 + R˜2), (11)
H(T1(L0, L1)|L0, Q
n, Zn, C)
(b)
≤ n(T1 − I(V1;Z|V0) + δ(ǫ)), (12)
H(T2(L0, L2)|L0, Q
n, Zn, C)
(c)
≤ n(T2 − I(V2;Z|V0) + δ(ǫ)), (13)
where (b) and (c) come from the following analysis. First consider
H(T1(L0, L1)|L0, Q
n, Zn, C) = H(T1(L0, L1)|v
n
0 (L0), Q
n, Zn, L0, C)
≤ H(T1(L0, L1)|V
n
0 , Z
n).
We now upper bound the term H(T1(L0, L1)|V n0 , Zn).
Since P{(Qn, V n0 (L0), V n1 (L0, T1(L0, L1)), V n2 (L0, T2(L0, L2)), Zn) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ } → 1 as n→∞,
P{(V n0 (L0), V
n
1 (L0, T1(L0, L1)), Z
n) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ } → 1 as n→∞. We can therefore apply Lemma 1 to obtain
H(T1(L0, L1)|L0, Q
n, Zn, C) ≤ n(T1 − I(V1;Z|V0) + δ(ǫ)),
if T1 ≥ I(V1;Z|V0) + δ(ǫ).
The term H(T2(L0, L2)(L0, L2)|L0, Qn, Zn, C) can be bound using the same steps to give
H(T2(L0, L2)|L0, Q
n, Zn, C) ≤ n(T2 − I(V2;Z|V0) + δ(ǫ)),
if T2 ≥ I(V2;Z|V0) + δ(ǫ).
Substituting from (11), (12), and (13) into (10) yields
I(T1(L0, L1), T2(L0, L2);Z
n|L0, Q
n, C)
≥ n(R˜1 + R˜2)− n(T1 − I(V1;Z|V0) + δ(ǫ)) − n(T2 − I(V2;Z|V0) + δ(ǫ)). (14)
Substituting inequality (14), together with (8) and (9) into (7) then yields
I(M ;Zn|Qn, C) ≤ n(I(V1;V2;Z|V0) + T1 + T2 − R˜1 − R˜2 − I(V1;Z|V0)− I(V2;Z|V0) + 3δ(ǫ)).
Hence, I(M ;Zn|Qn, C) ≤ 3nδ(ǫ) if
I(V1;V2;Z|V0) + T1 + T2 − R˜1 − R˜2 − I(V1;Z|V0)− I(V2;Z|V0) ≤ 0.
In summary, the rate constraints arising from the analysis of equivocation rate are
S0 −R ≥ I(V0;Z|Q),
T1 ≥ I(V1;Z|V0),
T2 ≥ I(V2;Z|V0),
T1 + T2 − R˜1 − R˜2 ≤ I(V1;Z|V0) + I(V2;Z|V0)− I(V1;V2;Z|V0).
9
Applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination gives
R < I(V0, V1;Y1|Q)− I(V0, V1;Z|Q),
R < I(V0, V2;Y2|Q)− I(V0, V2;Z|Q),
2R < I(V0, V1;Y1|Q) + I(V0, V2;Y2|Q)− 2I(V0;Z|Q)− I(V1;V2|V0)
for some p(q, v0, v1, v2, x) = p(q, v0)p(v1, v2|v0)p(x|v1, v2, v0) such that I(V1, V2;Z|V0) ≤ I(V1;Z|V0)+I(V2;Z|V0)−
I(V1;V2|V0).
The proof of Theorem 1 is then completed by observing that the third inequality is redundant. This is seen by
summing the first two inequalities to yield
2R ≤ I(V0, V1;Y1|Q)− I(V0, V1;Z|Q) + I(V0, V2;Y2|Q)− I(V0, V2;Z|Q)
= I(V0, V1;Y1|Q)− I(V0, V1;Z|Q) + I(V0, V2;Y2|Q)− 2I(V0;Z|Q)− I(V1;Z|V0)− I(V2;Z|V0).
This inequality is at least as tight as the third inequality because of the constraint on the pmf. This completes the
proof of Theorem 1.
Special Cases:
We consider several special cases in which the inner bound in Theorem 1 is tight.
Reversely Degraded Product Broadcast Channel: As an example of Theorem 1, consider the reversely degraded
product broadcast channel with sender X = (X1, X2 . . . , Xk), receivers Yj = (Yj1, Yj2 . . . , Yjk) for j = 1, 2, 3, and
conditional probability mass functions p(y1, y2, z|x) =
∏k
l=1 p(y1l, y2l, zl|xl). In [5], the following lower bound on
secrecy capacity is established
CS ≥ min
j∈{1,2}
k∑
l=1
[I(Ul;Yjl)− I(Ul;Zl)]
+. (15)
for some p(u1, . . . , uk, x) =
∏k
l=1 p(ul)p(xl|ul). Furthermore, this lower bound is shown to be optimal when
the channel is reversely degraded (with Ul = Xl), i.e., when each sub-channel is degraded but not necessarily
in the same order. We can show that this result is a special case of Theorem 1. Define the sets of l indexes:
C = {l : I(Ul;Y1l) − I(Ul;Zl) ≥ 0, I(Ul;Y2l) − I(Ul;Zl) ≥ 0}, A = {l : I(Ul;Y1l) − I(Ul;Zl) ≥ 0} and
B = {l : I(Ul;Y2l)− I(Ul;Zl) ≥ 0}. Now, setting V0 = {Ul : l ∈ C}, V1 = {Ul : l ∈ A}, and V2 = {Ul : l ∈ B}
in the rate expression of Theorem 1 yields (15). Note that the constraint in Theorem 1 is satisfied for this choice
of auxiliary random variables. The expanded equations are as follows:
I(V1, V2;Z|V0) = I(UA, UB;Z|UC)
= I(UA\C , UB\C ;Z\C)
= I(UA\C ;Z,A\C) + I(UB\C ;Z,B\C)
= I(V1;Z|V0) + I(V2;Z|V0),
I(V0, V1;Y1)− I(V0, V1;Z) = I(UA;Y1,A)− I(UA;ZA),
I(V0, V1;Y1)− I(V0, V1;Z) = I(UB;Y1,A)− I(UB;ZB),
I(V1;V2|V0) = I(UA\C ;UB\C) = 0.
Receivers Y1 and Y2 are less noisy than Z: Recall that in a 2-receiver broadcast channel, a receiver Y is said to
be less noisy [14] than a receiver Z if I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;Z) for all p(u, x). In this case, we have
CS = max
p(x)
min{I(X ;Y1)− I(X ;Z), I(X ;Y2)− I(X ;Z)}.
To show achievability, we set Q = ∅ and V0 = V1 = V2 = V3 = X in Theorem 1. The converse follows similar
steps to the converse for Proposition 2 in Subsection IV-B given in Appendix IV and we omit it here.
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B. 2-Receivers, 1-Eavesdropper with Common Message
As a generalization of Theorem 1, consider the setting with both common and confidential messages, where we
are interested in achieving some equivocation rate for the confidential message rather than asymptotic secrecy. For
this setting we can establish the following inner bound on the secrecy capacity region.
Theorem 2: An inner bound to the secrecy capacity region of the 2-receiver, 1-eavesdropper broadcast channel
with one common and one confidential messages is given by the set of non-negative rate tuples (R0, R1, Re) such
that
R0 < I(U ;Z),
R0 +R1 < I(U ;Z) + min{I(V0, V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|V0), I(V0, V2;Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|V0)},
R0 +R1 < min{I(V0, V1;Y1)− I(V1;Z|V0), I(V0, V2;Y2)− I(V2;Z|V0)},
Re ≤ R1,
Re < min{I(V0, V1;Y1|U)− I(V0, V1;Z|U), I(V0, V2;Y2|U)− I(V0, V2;Z|U)},
R0 +Re < min{I(V0, V1;Y1)− I(V1, V0;Z|U), I(V0, V2;Y2)− I(V2, V0;Z|U)},
R0 + 2Re < I(V0, V1;Y1) + I(V0, V2;Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|V0)− 2I(V0;Z|U),
R0 + 2Re < I(V0, V2;Y2) + I(V0, V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;V2|V0)− 2I(V0;Z|U),
R0 +R1 + 2Re < I(V0, V2;Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|V0) + I(V0, V1;Y1)
+ I(V0, V2;Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|V0)− 2I(V0;Z|U),
R0 +R1 + 2Re < I(V0, V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|V0) + I(V0, V2;Y2)
+ I(V0, V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;V2|V0)− 2I(V0;Z|U),
for some p(u, v0, v1, v2, x) = p(u)p(v0|u)p(v1, v2|v0)p(x|v0, v1, v2) such that I(V1, V2;Z|V0) ≤ I(V1;Z|V0) +
I(V2;Z|V0)− I(V1;V2|V0).
Note that if we discard the equivocation rate constraints and set V0 = V1 = V2 = X , this inner bound reduces to
the straightforward extension of the Ko¨rner–Marton degraded message set capacity region for the 3 receivers case
[8, Corollary 1].
If we take V0 = V1 = V2 = V and Y1 = Y2 = Y , then we obtain the region consisting of all rate pairs (R0, R1)
such that
R0 < I(U ;Z), (16)
R0 +R1 < I(U ;Z) + I(V ;Y |U),
R0 +R1 < I(V ;Y ),
Re ≤ R1,
Re < I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U),
R0 +Re < I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z|U) (17)
for some p(u, v, x) = p(u)p(v|u)p(x|v).
This region provides an equivalent characterization of the secrecy capacity region of the 2-receiver broad-
cast channel with confidential messages [2]. To see this, note that if we tighten the first inequality to R0 ≤
min{I(U ;Z), I(U ;Y )}, the last inequality becomes redundant and the region reduces to the original characterization
in [2].
Proof of Theorem 2:
The proof of Theorem 2 involves rate splitting for R1(= R′1 + R′′1 ). We first establish an inner bound without
rate splitting. The proof with rate splitting is given in Appendix III.
Codebook generation: Fix p(u, v0, v1, v2, x) and let Rr ≥ 0 be such that R1 − Re + Rr ≥ I(V0;Z|U) + δ(ǫ).
Randomly and independently generate sequences un(m0), m0 ∈ [1 : 2nR0 ], each according to
∏n
i=1 pU (ui).
For each m0, randomly and conditionally independently generate sequences vn0 (m0,m1,mr), (m1,mr) ∈ [1 :
2n(R1+Rr)], each according to
∏n
i=1 pV0|U (v0i|ui). For each (m0,m1,mr), generate sequences vn1 (m0,m1,mr, t1),
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t1 ∈ [1 : 2
nT1 ], each according to
∏n
i=1 pV1|V0(v1i|v0i), and partition the set [1 : 2nT1 ] into 2nR˜1 equal size bins
B(m0,m1,mr, l1). Similarly, for each (m0,m1,mr), randomly generate sequences vn2 (m0,m1,mr, t2), t2 ∈ [1 :
2nT2 ] each according to
∏n
i=1 pV2|V0(v2i|v0i) and partition the set [1 : 2nT2 ] into 2nR˜2 bins B(m0,m1,mr, l2). Fi-
nally, for each product bin B(l1)×B(l2), find a jointly typical sequence pair (vn1 (m0,m1,mr, t1(l1)), vn2 (m0,m1,mr, t2(l2)).
If there is more than 1 pair, we randomly and uniformly pick a pair from the set of jointly typical pairs. As before,
the probability of error approaches zero as n→∞ if
R˜1 + R˜2 < T1 + T2 − I(V1;V2|V0)− δ(ǫ).
Encoding: To send a message pair (m0,m1), the encoder first chooses a random index mr ∈ [1 : 2nRr ] and then
the sequence pair (un(m0), vn0 (m1,mr,m0)). It then randomly chooses a product bin indices (L1, L2) and selects
the jointly typical sequence pair
(vn1 (m0,m1,mr, t1(L1)), v
n
2 (m0,m1,mr, t2(L2)) in it. Finally, it generates a codeword Xn at random
according to
∏n
i=1 pX|V0,V1.V2(xi|v0i, v1i, v2i).
Decoding and analysis of the probability of error: Receiver Y1 finds (m0,m1) indirectly by looking for the unique
(m0, lˆ0) such that (un(m0), vn0 (m0, lˆ0), vn1 (m0, lˆ0, l1)) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ for some l1 ∈ [1 : 2nT1 ]. Similarly, receiver Y2 finds
(m0,m1) indirectly by looking for the unique (m0, lˆ0) such that (un(m0), vn0 (m0, lˆ0), vn1 (m0, lˆ0, l2)) ∈ T
(n)
ǫ for
some l2 ∈ [1 : 2nT2 ]. Receiver Z finds m0 directly by decoding U . These steps succeed with probability of error
approaching zero as n→∞ if
R0 +R1 + T1 +Rr < I(V0, V1;Y1)− δ(ǫ),
R1 + T1 +Rr < I(V0, V1;Y1|U)− δ(ǫ),
R0 +R1 + T2 +Rr < I(V0, V1;Y2)− δ(ǫ),
R1 + T2 +Rr < I(V0, V1;Y2|U)− δ(ǫ),
R0 < I(U ;Z).
Analysis of equivocation rate: We consider the equivocation rate averaged over codes. We will show that a part of
the message M1p can be kept asymptotically secret from the eavesdropper as long as rate constraints on Re and
R1 are satisfied. Let R1 = R1p +R1c and Re = R1p.
H(M1|Z
n, C) ≥ H(M1p|Z
n,M0, C)
= H(M1p)− I(M1p;Z
n|M0, C) (18)
(a)
≥ H(M1p)− 3nδ(ǫ)
= n(R1 − I(V0;Z|U))− 3nδ(ǫ).
This implies that Re ≤ R1 − I(V0;Z|U)− 3δ(ǫ) is achievable.
To prove step (a), consider
I(M1p;Z
n|M0, C) = I(T1(L1), T2(L2),M1p,M1c,Mr;Z
n|M0, C)− I(T1(L1), T2(L2),M1c,Mr;Z
n|M1p,M0, C)
(b)
≤ I(V n0 , V
n
1 , V
n
2 ;Z
n|M0, C)− I(M1c,Mr;Z
n|M1p,M0, C)− I(T1(L1), T2(L2);Z
n|M1,M0,Mr, C)
(c)
≤ I(V n0 , V
n
1 , V
n
2 ;Z
n|Un, C)− I(M1c,Mr;Z
n|M1p,M0, C)− I(T1(L1), T2(L2);Z
n|M1,M0,Mr, C)
≤ nI(V0, V1, V2;Z|U) + nδ(ǫ)−H(M1c,Mr|M1p, U
n, C) +H(M1c,Mr|M1p,M0, Z
n, C)
− I(T1(L1), T2(L2);Z
n|M1,M0,Mr, C)
≤ nI(V0, V1, V2;Z|U) + nδ(ǫ)− n(R1 −Re +Rr) +H(M1c,Mr|M1p,M0, Z
n, C)
− I(T1(L1), T2(L2);Z
n|M1,M0,Mr, C),
where (b) follows by the data processing inequality and (c) follows by the observation that Un is a function of
(C,M0) and (C,M0) → (C, Un, V n) → Zn. Following the analysis of the equivocation rate terms in Theorem 1
and using Lemma 1, the remaining terms can be bounded by
H(M1c,Mr|M1p,M0, Z
n, C) ≤ H(M1c,Mr|M1p, U
n, Zn)
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≤ n(R1 −Re +Rr)− nI(V0;Z|U) + nδ(ǫ),
I(T1(L1), T2(L2);Z
n|M1,M0,Mr, C) = H(T1(L1), T2(L2)|M1,M0,Mr, C)−H(T1(L1), T2(L2)|M1,M0,Mr, C, Z
n)
= n(R˜1 + R˜2)−H(T1(L1), T2(L2)|M1,M0,Mr, C, Z
n)
(a)
= n(R˜1 + R˜2)−H(T1(L1), T2(L2)|Mr,M1,M0, V
n
0 , C, Z
n)
≥ n(R˜1 + R˜2)−H(T1(L1), T2(L2)|V
n
0 , Z
n)
≥ n(R˜1 + R˜2 − T1 − T2) + n(I(V1;Z|V0) + I(V2;Z|V0))− 2nδ(ǫ),
if T1 ≥ I(V1;Z|V0) + δ(ǫ), and T2 ≥ I(V2;Z|V0) + δ(ǫ). Step (a) follows from the observation that V n0 is a
function of (C,M0,M1).
Thus, we have
I(M1p;Z
n|M0, C) ≤ I(V1, V2;Z|V0)− I(V1;Z|V0)− I(V2;Z|V0) + n(T1 + T2 − R˜1 − R˜2) + 4nδ(ǫ).
Hence, I(M1p;Zn|M0, C) ≤ 4nδ(ǫ) if
I(V1;V2;Z|V0) + T1 + T2 − R˜1 − R˜2 − I(V1;Z|V0)− I(V2;Z|V0)) ≤ 0.
Substituting back into (18) shows that
H(M1|Z
n, C) ≥ n(R1 − I(V0;Z|U)− 4nδ(ǫ).
The equivocation rate constraints on the rates are
Re ≤ R1,
Rr ≥ 0,
R1 −Re +Rr ≥ I(V0;Z|U),
T1 ≥ I(V1;Z|V0),
T2 ≥ I(V2;Z|V0).
Using Fourier-Motzkin elimination then gives us an inner bound for the case without rate splitting. The proof with
rate splitting on R1 is given in Appendix III.
Special Case:
We show that the inner bound in Theorem 2 is tight when both Y1 and Y2 are less noisy than Z .
Proposition 2: When both Y1 and Y2 are less noisy than Z , the 2-receiver, 1-eavesdropper secrecy capacity
region is given by the set of (R0, R1, Re) tuples such that
R0 ≤ I(U ;Z),
R1 ≤ min{I(X ;Y1|U), I(X ;Y2|U)},
Re ≤ [min{R1, I(X ;Y1|U)− I(X ;Z|U), I(X ;Y2|U)− I(X ;Z|U)}]
+
for some p(u, x).
Achievability follows by setting V0 = V1 = V2 = X in Theorem 2 and using the fact that Y1 and Y2 are less noisy
than Z , which allows us to assume without loss of generality that R0 ≤ min{I(U ;Z), I(U ;Y1), I(U ;Y2)}. The
set of inequalities then reduce to
R0 < I(U ;Z),
R0 +R1 < I(U ;Z) + min{I(X ;Y1|U), I(X ;Y2|U)},
Re ≤ R1,
Re < min{I(X ;Y1|U)− I(X ;Z|U), I(X ;Y2|U)− I(X ;Z|U)}.
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Since the region in Proposition 2 is a subset of the above region, we have established the achievability part of
the proof. Achievability in this case, however, is a straightforward extension of Csisza´r and Ko¨rner and does not
require Marton coding. For the converse, we use the identification Ui = (M0, Zi−1). With this identification, the
R0 inequality follows trivially. The R1 and Re inequalities follow from standard methods and a technique in [8,
Proposition 11]. The details are given in Appendix IV.
V. 1-RECEIVER, 2-EAVESDROPPERS WIRETAP CHANNEL
We now consider the case where the confidential message M1 is to be sent only to Y1 and kept hidden from the
eavesdroppers Z2 and Z3. All three receivers Y1, Z2, Z3 require a common message M0. For simplicity, we only
consider the special case of multilevel broadcast channel [10], where p(y1, z2, z3|x) = p(y1, z3|x)p(z2|y1). In [8],
it was shown that the capacity region (without secrecy) is the set of rate pairs (R0, R1) such that
R0 < min{I(U ;Z2), I(U3;Z3)},
R1 < I(X ;Y1|U),
R0 +R1 < I(U3;Z3) + I(X ;Y1|U3)
for some p(u)p(u3|u)p(x|u3). We extend this result to obtain inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region.
Proposition 3: An inner bound to the secrecy capacity region of the 1-receiver, 2-eavesdropper multilevel broad-
cast channel with common and confidential messages is is given by the set of rate tuples (R0, R1, Re2, Re3) such
that
R0 < min{I(U ;Z2), I(U3;Z3)},
R1 < I(V ;Y1|U),
R0 +R1 < I(U3;Z3) + I(V ;Y1|U3),
Re2 ≤ min{R1, I(V ;Y1|U)− I(V ;Z2|U)},
Re2 ≤ [I(U3;Z3)−R0 − I(U3;Z2|U)]
+ + I(V ;Y1|U3)− I(V ;Z2|U3),
Re3 ≤ min{R1, [I(V ;Y1|U3)− I(V ;Z3|U3)]
+},
Re2 +Re3 ≤ R1 + I(V ;Y1|U3)− I(V ;Z2|U3),
for some p(u, u3, v, x) = p(u)p(u3|u)p(v|u3)p(x|v).
It can be shown that setting Y1 = Z2 = Y and Z3 = Z gives an alternative characterization of the secrecy
capacity of the broadcast channel with confidential messages.
Proof of achievability: We break down the proof of Proposition 3 into four cases and give the analysis of the first
case in detail. The analyses for the rest of the cases are similar and we therefore we only provide a sketch in Appendix
V. Furthermore, in all cases, we assume that R1 ≥ min{I(V ;Y1|U3)−I(V ;Z2|U3), [I(V ;Y1|U3)−I(V ;Z3|U3)]+}.
It is easy to see from our proof that if this inequality does not hold, then we achieve equivocation rates of
Re2 = Re3 = R1 for any rate pair(R0, R1) satisfying the inequalities in the proposition. The four cases are:
• Case 1: I(U3;Z3) − R0 − I(U3;Z2|U) ≥ 0, I(V ;Y1|U3) − I(V ;Z2|U3) ≤ I(V ;Y1|U3) − I(V ;Z3|U3) and
Re3 ≥ I(V ;Y1|U3)− I(V ;Z2|U3);
• Case 2: I(U3;Z3) − R0 − I(U3;Z2|U) ≥ 0, I(V ;Y1|U3) − I(V ;Z2|U3) ≤ I(V ;Y1|U3) − I(V ;Z3|U3) and
Re3 ≤ I(V ;Y1|U3)− I(V ;Z2|U3);
• Case 3: I(U3;Z3)−R0− I(U3;Z2|U) ≥ 0, I(V ;Y1|U3)− I(V ;Z2|U3) ≥ I(V ;Y1|U3)− I(V ;Z3|U3). In this
case, since we consider only the case of R1 ≥ I(V ;Y1|U3)− I(V ;Z3|U3), we will see that an equivocation
rate of Re3 = I(V ;Y1|U3)− I(V ;Z3|U3) can be achieved;
• Case 4: I(U3;Z3)−R0 − I(U3;Z2|U) ≤ 0.
Now, consider Case 1, where I(U3;Z3)−R0 − I(U3;Z2|U) ≥ 0, I(V ;Y1|U3)− I(V ;Z2|U3) ≤ I(V ;Y1|U3)−
I(V ;Z3|U3) and Re3 ≥ I(V ;Y1|U3)− I(V ;Z2|U3).
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Codebook generation: Fix p(u, u3, v, x) = p(u)p(u3|u)p(v|u3)p(x|v). Let R1 = Ro10 + Rs10 + R′11 + R′′11 + Ro11.
Let Rr0 ≥ 0 and Rr1 ≥ 0 be the randomization rates introduced by the encoder. These are not part of the message
rate. Let R˜10 = Ro10 +Rs10 +Rr0 and R˜11 = R′11 +R′′11 +Ro11 +Rr1.
Randomly and independently generate sequences un(m0), m0 ∈ [1 : 2nR0 ], each according to
∏n
i=1 pU (ui).
For each m0, randomly and conditionally independently generate sequences un3 (m0, l0), l0 ∈ [1 : 2nR˜10 ], each
according to
∏n
i=1 pU3|U (u3i|ui). For each (m0, l0), randomly and conditionally independently generate sequences
vn(m0, l0, l1), l1 ∈ [1 : 2nR˜11 ], each according to
∏n
i=1 pV |U3(vi|u3i).
Encoding: To send a message (m0,m1), we split m1 into sub-messages with the corresponding rates given in the
codebook generation step and generate the randomization messages (mr10,mr11) uniformly at random from the set
[1 : 2nR
r
0 ]× [1 : 2nR
r
1 ]. We then select the sequence vn(m0, l0, l1) corresponding to (m0,m1,mr10,mr11) and send
Xn generated according to
∏n
i=1 pX|V (xi|vi(l1, l0,m0)).
Decoding and analysis of the probability of error: Receiver Y1 finds (m0,m1) by decoding (U,U3, V ), Z2 finds
m0 by decoding U , and Z3 finds m0 indirectly through (U,U3). The probability of error goes to zero as n→∞ if
R0 ≤ I(U ;Z2),
R0 +R
o
10 +R
r
0 +R
s
10 < I(U3;Z3)− δ(ǫ),
Rs10 +R
o
10 +R
r
0 < I(U3;Y1|U)− δ(ǫ),
R′11 +R
′′
11 +R
o
11 +R
r
1 < I(V ;Y1|U3)− δ(ǫ).
Analysis of equivocation rates: We show that the following equivocation rates are achievable.
Re2 = R
s
10 +R
′
11 − δ(ǫ),
Re3 = R
′
11 +R
′′
11 − δ(ǫ).
It is straightforward to show that the stated equivocation rate Re3 is achievable if
Rr1 +R
o
11 > I(V ;Z3|U3) + δ(ǫ).
The analysis of the H(M1|Zn2 , C) term is slightly more involved. Consider
I(M s10,M
′
11;Z
n
2 |M0, C) = I(L0, L1;Z
n
2 |C,M0)− I(L0, L1;Z
n
2 |C,M0,M
s
10,M
′
11)
≤ I(V n;Zn2 |C, U
n)− I(L0;Z
n
2 |C,M0,M
s
10,M
′
11)− I(L1;Z
n
2 |C,M0, L0,M
′
11)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(V ;Z2|U)− I(L0;Z
n
2 |C,M0,M
s
10,M
′
11)− I(L1;Z
n
2 |C,M0, L0,M
′
11).
Now consider the second and third terms. We have
I(L0;Z
n
2 |C,M0,M
s
10,M
′
11) = H(L0|C,M0,M
s
10,M
′
11)−H(L0|C,M0,M
s
10,M
′
11, Z
n
2 , U
n)
≥ n(R˜10 −R
s
10)−H(L0|C,M
s
10, Z
n
2 , U
n)
≥ n(I(U3;Z2|U)− δ(ǫ)).
The last step follows from Lemma 1, which holds if
R˜10 −R
s
10 = R
o
10 +R
r
0
≥ I(U3;Z2|U) + δ(ǫ).
For the third term, we have
I(L1;Z
n
2 |C,M0, L0,M
′
11) = H(L1|C,M0, L0,M
′
11)−H(L1|C,M0, L0,M
′
11, Z
n
2 , U
n)
≥ n(R˜11 −R
′
11)−H(L1|C,M
′
11, Z
n
2 , U
n)
≥ n(R˜11 −R
′
11)− n(R˜11 −R
′
11 − I(V ;Z2|U3) + δ(ǫ)).
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In the last step, we again apply Lemma 1, which holds if
R′′11 +R
o
11 +R
r
1 ≥ I(V ;Z|U3) + δ(ǫ).
In summary, the inequalities for Case 1 are as follows:
Decoding Constraints: (with R0 ≤ I(U ;Z2) omitted since this inequality appears in the final rate-equivocation
region and does not contain the auxiliary rates to be eliminated.)
R0 +R
o
10 +R
r
0 +R
s
10 < I(U3;Z3),
Rs10 +R
o
10 +R
r
0 < I(U3;Y1|U),
R′11 +R
′′
11 +R
o
11 +R
r
1 < I(V ;Y1|U3).
Equivocation rate constraints:
Ro10 +R
r
o > I(U3;Z2|U),
R′′11 +R
r
1 +R
o
11 > I(V ;Z2|U3),
Rr1 +R
o
11 > I(V ;Z3|U3).
Greater than or equal to zero constraints:
Ro10, R
o
0, R
′
11, R
′′
11, R
n
1 , R
r
0 ≥ 0.
Equality constraints:
R1 = R
o
10 +R
s
10 +R
′
11 +R
′′
11 +R
o
11,
Re2 = R
s
10 +R
′
11,
Re3 = R
′
11 +R
′′
11.
Applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination yields the rate-equivocation region for Case one. Sketch of achievability
for the other cases are given in Appendix V.
We now establish an outer bound and use it to show that the inner bound in Proposition 3 is tight in several
special cases. In contrast to the case with no secrecy constraint [8], the assumption of a stochastic encoder makes
it difficult to match our inner and outer bounds in general.
Proposition 4: An outer bound on the secrecy capacity of the multilevel 3-receiver broadcast channel with one
common and one confidential messages is given by the set of rate tuples (R0, R1, Re2, Re3) such that
R0 ≤ min{I(U ;Z2), I(U3;Z3)},
R1 ≤ I(V ;Y1|U),
R0 +R1 ≤ I(U3;Z3) + I(V ;Y1|U3),
Re2 ≤ I(X ;Y1|U)− I(X ;Z2|U),
Re2 ≤ [I(U3;Z3)−R0 − I(U3;Z2|U)]
+ + I(X ;Y1|U3)− I(X ;Z2|U3),
Re3 ≤ [I(V ;Y1|U3)− I(V ;Z3|U3)]
+
for some p(u, u3, v, x) = p(u)p(u3|u)p(v|u3)p(x|v).
Proof of this Proposition uses a combination of standard converse techniques from [15], [16], and [2] and given in
Appendix VI.
Remark 5.1: As we can see in the inequalities governing Re2 in both the inner and outer bounds, there is a tradeoff
between the common message rate and the equivocation rate at receiver Z2. A higher common message rate limits
the number of codewords that can be generated to confuse the eavesdropper.
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Special Cases
Using Propositions 3 and 4, we can establish the secrecy capacity region for the following special cases.
Y1 more capable than Z3 and Z3 more capable than Z2: If Y1 is more capable [15] than Z3 and Z3 is more
capable than Z2, the capacity region is given by:
R0 ≤ min{I(U ;Y2), I(U3;Z3)},
R1 ≤ I(X ;Y1|U),
R0 +R1 ≤ I(U3;Z3) + I(X ;Y1|U3),
Re2 ≤ I(X ;Y1|U)− I(X ;Z2|U),
Re2 ≤ [I(U3;Z3)−R0 − I(U3;Z2|U)]
+ + I(X ;Y1|U3)− I(X ;Z2|U3),
Re3 ≤ I(X ;Y1|U3)− I(X ;Z3|U3)
for some p(u, u3, x) = p(u)p(u3|u)p(x|u3).
Achievability follows directly from setting V = X and observing that since Z3 is more capable than Z2, the
inequality Re2 + Re3 ≤ R1 + I(X ;Y1|U3) − I(X ;Z2|U3) is redundant since I(X ;Y1|U3) − I(X ;Z2|U3) ≥
I(X ;Y1|U3) − I(X ;Z3|U3) from the more capable condition. For the converse, observe that since Y1 is more
capable than Z3, we have
I(V ;Y1|U3)− I(V ;Z3|U3) = I(V,X ;Y1|U3)− I(V,X ;Z3|U3)− I(X ;Y1|V ) + I(X ;Z3|V )
≤ I(X ;Y1|U3)− I(X ;Z3|U3).
One eavesdropper: Here, we consider the two scenarios where either Z2 or Z3 is an eavesdropper and the other
receiver is neutral, i.e., there is no constraint on its equivocation rate, but it still decodes a common message. The
secrecy capacity regions for these two scenarios are as follows.
Z3 is neutral: The secrecy capacity region is the set of rate tuples (R0, R1, Re2) such that
R0 ≤ min{I(U ;Y2), I(U3;Z3)},
R1 ≤ I(X ;Y1|U),
R0 + R1 ≤ I(U3;Z3) + I(X ;Y1|U3),
Re2 ≤ I(X ;Y1|U)− I(X ;Z2|U),
Re2 ≤ [I(U3;Z3)−R0 − I(U3;Z2|U)]
+ + I(X ;Y1|U3)− I(X ;Z2|U3)
for some p(u, u3, x) = p(u)p(u3|u)p(x|u3).
Z2 is neutral: The secrecy capacity region is the set of rate tuples (R0, R1, Re3) such that
R0 ≤ min{I(U ;Z2), I(U3;Z3)},
R1 ≤ I(V ;Y1|U),
R0 +R1 ≤ I(U3;Z3) + I(V ;Y1|U3),
Re3 ≤ [I(V ;Y1|U3)− I(V ;Z3|U3)]
+
for some p(u, u3, v, x) = p(u)p(u3|u)p(v|u3)p(x|v).
VI. CONCLUSION
We presented inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region of the 3-receiver broadcast channel with
common and confidential messages that are strictly larger than straightforward extensions of the Csisza´r–Ko¨rner
2-receiver region. We considered the 2-receiver, 1-eavesdropper and the 1-receiver, 2-eavesdroppers cases. For the
first case, we showed that additional superposition encoding, whereby a codeword is picked at random from a
pre-generated codebook can increase the achievable rate by allowing the legitimate receiver to indirectly decode the
message without sacrificing secrecy. A general lower bound on the secrecy capacity is then obtained by combining
superposition encoding and indirect decoding with Marton coding. This lower bound is shown to be tight for the
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reversely degraded product channel and when both Y1 and Y2 are less noisy than the eavesdropper. The lower
bound was generalized in Theorem 2 to obtain an inner bound on the secrecy capacity region for the 2-receiver,
1 eavesdropper case. For the case where both Y1 and Y2 are less noisy than the eavesdropper, we again show that
our inner bound gives the secrecy capacity region.
We then established inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region for the 1-receiver, 2-eavesdroppers
multilevel wiretap channel. The inner bound and outer bounds are shown to be tight for several special cases.
In the results for both setups, we observe a tradeoff between the common message rate and the eavesdropper
equivocation rates. A higher common message rate limits the number of codewords that can be generated to confuse
the eavesdroppers about the confidential message. In addition, in the second setup, a higher common message rate
can potentially reduce the equivocation rate of one eavesdropper while leaving the equivocation rate at the other
eavesdropper unchanged.
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APPENDIX I
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
First, define N(Un, Zn) = |{k ∈ [1 : 2nS] : (Un, V n(k), Zn) ∈ T (n)ǫ }|. Next, we define the following “error”
events. Let E1(Un, Zn) = 1 if {N(Un, Zn) ≥ (1 + δ1(ǫ))2n(S−I(V ;Z|U)+δ(ǫ))} and E1 = 0 otherwise. Let
E = 0 if (Un, V n(L), Zn) ∈ T (n)ǫ and E1(Un, Zn, L) = 0, and E = 1 otherwise. We now show that if S ≥
I(V ;Z|U) + δ(ǫ), then P{E = 1} → 0 as n→∞. By the union of events bound,
P{E = 1} ≤ P{(Un, V n(L), Zn) /∈ T (n)ǫ }+ P{E1(U
n, Zn, L) = 1}.
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The first term tends to zero as n→∞ by assumption. The second term is bounded as follows
P{E1(U
n, Zn) = 1} =
∑
un∈T
(n)
ǫ
p(un) P{(E1(U
n, Zn) = 1)|Un = un}
=
∑
un∈T
(n)
ǫ
∑
zn∈T
(n)
ǫ (Z|U)
p(un) P{(E1(u
n, Zn) = 1) ∩ (Zn = zn)|Un = un}
=
∑
un∈T
(n)
ǫ
∑
zn∈T
(n)
ǫ (Z|U)
p(un) P{(E1(u
n, zn) = 1) ∩ (Zn = zn)|Un = un}
≤
∑
un∈T
(n)
ǫ
p(un)
∑
zn∈T
(n)
ǫ (Z|U)
P{(E1(u
n, zn) = 1)|Un = un}.
Now, P{E1(un, zn) = 1|Un = un} = P{N(un, zn) ≥ (1 + δ1(ǫ))2n(S−I(V ;Z|U)+δ(ǫ))|Un = un}. Define Xk = 1
if (un, V n(k), zn) ∈ T (n)ǫ and 0, otherwise. We note that Xk, k ∈ [1 : 2nS ], are i.i.d. Bernoulli p random variables,
where 2−n(I(V ;Z|U)+δ(ǫ)) ≤ p ≤ 2−n(I(V ;Z|U)−δ(ǫ)). We have
P{N(un, zn) ≥ (1 + δ1(ǫ))2
n(S−I(V ;Z|U)+δ(ǫ))|Un = un}
≤ P


2nS∑
k=1
Xk ≥ (1 + δ1(ǫ))2
nSp|Un = un

 .
Applying the Chernoff Bound (e.g., see [11, Appendix B]), we have
P


2nS∑
k=1
Xk ≥ (1 + δ1(ǫ))2
nSp|Un = un

 ≤ exp(−2nSpδ21(ǫ)/4)
≤ exp(−2n(S−I(V ;Z|U)−δ(ǫ))δ21(ǫ)/4).
Hence,
P{E1(U
n, Zn) = 1} ≤
∑
un∈T
(n)
ǫ
p(un)
∑
zn∈T
(n)
ǫ (Z|U)
exp(−2n(S−I(V ;Z|U)−δ(ǫ))δ21(ǫ)/4)
≤ 2n log |Z| exp(−2n(S−I(V ;Z|U)−δ(ǫ))δ21(ǫ)/4),
which tends to zero as n→∞ if S > I(V ;Z|U) + δ(ǫ).
We are now ready to bound H(L|C, Zn, Un). Consider
H(L,E|C, Un, Zn) ≤ 1 + P{E = 1}H(L|C, E = 1, Un, Zn) + P{E = 0}H(L|C, E = 0, Un, Zn)
≤ 1 + P{E = 1}nS + log((1 + δ1(ǫ))2
n(S−I(V ;Z|U)+δ(ǫ)))
≤ n(S − I(V ;Z|U) + δ′(ǫ)).
This completes the proof of the lemma.
APPENDIX II
EVALUATION FOR EXAMPLE
We first give an upper bound for the extended Csisza´r–Ko¨rner lower bound.
Fact: The extended Csisza´r and Ko¨rner lower bound in (6) for the channel shown in Figure 2 is upper bounded
by
RCK ≤ min{I(X1;Y11)− I(X1;Z1) + I(V2;Y12|Q2)− I(V2;Z2|Q2), I(X1;Y21)
− I(X1;Z1)− I(V2;Z2|Q2)}.
for some p(x1)p(q2, v2)p(x2|v2).
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Proof: From (6), we have
R ≤ max
p(q)p(v|q)p(x|v)
min{I(V ;Y1|Q)− I(V ;Z|Q), I(V ;Y2|Q)− I(V ;Z|Q)}.
Consider the first bound for RCK.
I(V ;Y1|Q)− I(V ;Z|Q) = I(V ;Y11, Y12|Q)− I(V ;Z1|Q)− I(V ;Z2|Q,Z1)
≤ I(V ;Y11, Y12, Z1|Q)− I(V ;Z1|Q)− I(V ;Z2|Q,Z1)
= I(V ;Y11, Y12|Q,Z1)− I(V ;Z2|Q,Z1)
= I(V ;Y11|Q,Z1, Y12) + I(V ;Y12|Q,Z1)− I(V ;Z2|Q,Z1)
= I(V ;Y11, Z1|Q, Y12)− I(V ;Z1|Q, Y12) + I(V ;Y12|Q,Z1)− I(V ;Z2|Q,Z1)
(a)
= I(V ;Y11|Q, Y12)− I(V ;Z1|Q, Y12) + I(V ;Y12|Q,Z1)− I(V ;Z2|Q,Z1)
≤ I(V ′;Y11|Q)− I(V
′;Z1|Q) + I(V ;Y12|Q,Z1)− I(V ;Z2|Q,Z1).
(a) follows from the structure of the channel which gives the Markov condition (Q, Y12, V )− Y11 − Z1. The last
step follows from defining V ′ = (V, Y12) and the fact that Z1 is a degraded version of Y11.
Consider now the second bound.
RCK ≤ I(V ;Y2|Q)− I(V ;Z|Q)
= I(V ;Y21|Q)− I(V ;Z1|Q)− I(V ;Z2|Q,Z1)
≤ I(V ′;Y21|Q)− I(V
′;Z1|Q)− I(V ;Z2|Q,Z1).
Combining the bounds, we have
RCK ≤ max
p(q,v,v′,x1,x2)
min {I(V ′;Y11|Q)− I(V
′;Z1|Q) + I(V ;Y12|Q,Z1)− I(V ;Z2|Q,Z1), (19)
I(V ′;Y21|Q)− I(V
′;Z1|Q)− I(V ;Z2|Q,Z1)}
Now, we note that the terms I(V ′;Y11|Q) − I(V ′;Z1|Q) and I(V ′;Y21|Q) − I(V ′;Z1|Q) depends only on the
marginal distribution p(q, v′, x1)p(y21, y11, z1|x1). Similarly, define Q′ = (Q,Z1), the terms I(V ;Y12|Q′) −
I(V ;Z2|Q′) and I(V ;Z2|Q′) depends only on the marginal distribution p(q′, v, x2)p(y12, z2|x2). Therefore, we
can further upper bound RCK by
RCK ≤ maxmin {I(V1;Y11|Q1)− I(V1;Z1|Q1) + I(V2;Y12|Q2)− I(V2;Z2|Q2),
I(V1;Y21|Q1)− I(V1;Z1|Q1)− I(V2;Z2|Q2)} ,
where the maximum is over p(q1)p(v1|q1)p(x1|v1) and p(q2)p(v2|q2)p(x2|v2) 1. We now further simplify this bound
as follows.
RCK ≤ maxmin {I(V1;Y11|Q1)− I(V1;Z1|Q1) + I(V2;Y12|Q2)− I(V2;Z2|Q2),
I(V1;Y21|Q1)− I(V1;Z1|Q1)− I(V2;Z2|Q2)} ,
≤ maxmin {I(X1;Y11)− I(X1;Z1) + I(V2;Y12|Q2)− I(V2;Z2|Q2),
I(X1;Y21)− I(X1;Z1)− I(V2;Z2|Q2)} ,
where the maximum is now over distributions of the form p(x1) and p(q2)p(v2|q2)p(x2|v2). The last step follows
from the fact that Z1 is degraded with respect to both Y21 and Y11.
Next, we evaluate this upper bound. We will make use of the entropy relationship [17]: H(ap, 1−p, (1−a)p) =
H(p, 1− p) + pH(a, 1− a). First consider the terms for the first channel components,
1To see that this bound is larger than the previous bound in (19), set V1 = V ′, Q1 = Q, V2 = (V,Q′) and Q2 = Q′ in this bound to
recover the previous bound
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(I(X1;Y11) − I(X1;Z1)) and (I(X1;Y21) − I(X1;Z1)). Letting P{X1 = 0} = γ and evaluating the individual
expressions, we obtain
I(X1;Y21) = H(γ, 1− γ),
I(X1;Y11) = H
(
γ
2
,
1
2
,
1− γ
2
)
− 1
=
1
2
H(γ, 1− γ),
I(X1;Z1) = H
(
γ
6
,
5
6
,
5(1− γ)
6
)
−H
(
1
6
,
5
6
)
=
1
6
H(γ, 1− γ).
This gives
I(X1;Y21)− I(X1;Z1) =
5
6
H(γ, 1− γ),
I(X1;Y11)− I(X1;Z1) =
1
3
H(γ, 1− γ).
Note that both expressions are maximized by setting γ = 1/2, which yields
RCK ≤ min
{
1
3
+ I(V2;Y12|Q2)− I(V2;Z2|Q2),
5
6
− I(V2;Z2|Q2)
}
. (20)
Next, we consider the second channel component terms. Let αi = p(q2i), βj,i = p(v2j |q2i), P{X2 = 0|V2 =
v2j} = µj , and P{V2 = v2j} = νj , then
I(V2;Z2|Q2) =
∑
i
αiH
(∑
j βj,iµj
2
,
1
2
,
∑
j βj,i(1 − µj)
2
)
−
∑
j
νjH
(
µj
2
,
1
2
,
(1− µj)
2
)
=
1
2
∑
i
αiH

∑
j
βj,iµj ,
∑
j
βj,i(1− µj)

− 1
2
∑
j
νjH (µj , (1− µj)) ,
I(V2;Y12|Q2) =
∑
i
αiH

∑
j
βj,iµj ,
∑
j
βj,i(1 − µj)

−∑
j
νjH (µj , (1− µj)) .
This implies that
I(V2;Y12|Q2)− I(V2;Z2|Q2) =
1
2
∑
i
αiH

∑
j
βj,iµj ,
∑
j
βj,i(1− µj)

 − 1
2
∑
j
νjH (µj , (1− µj)) .
Comparing the above expressions, we see that I(V2;Z2|Q2) = 0 implies that I(V2;Y12|Q2) − I(V2;Z2|Q2) = 0.
This, together with (20), implies that RCK is strictly less than 5/6.
In comparison, consider the new lower bound in Corollary 1. Setting V = X1 and X1 and X2 independent
Bernoulli 1/2, we have
I(X1, X2;Y11, Y12)− I(X1, X2;Z1, Z2) = I(X1;Y11)− I(X1;Z1) + I(X2;Y12)− I(X2;Z2)
=
1
3
+
1
2
=
5
6
,
I(V ;Y2)− I(V ;Z) = I(X1;Y21)− I(X1;Z1, Z2)
= I(X1;Y21)− I(X1;Z1) =
5
6
.
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Thus, R = 5/6 is achievable using the new scheme, which shows that the our lower bound can be strictly larger
than the extended Csisza´r and Ko¨rner lower bound. In fact, R = 5/6 is the capacity for this example since the
channel is a special case of the reversely degraded broadcast channel considered in [5] and we can use the converse
result therein to show that CS ≤ 5/6.
APPENDIX III
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Using Fourier–Motzkin elimination on the rate constraints gives the following region.
R0 < I(U ;Z),
R1 < min{I(V0, V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|V0), I(V0, V2;Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|V0)},
2R1 < I(V0, V1;Y1|U) + I(V0, V2;Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|V0), (21)
R0 +R1 < min{I(V0, V1;Y1)− I(V1;Z|V0), I(V0, V2;Y2)− I(V2;Z|V0)},
R0 + 2R1 < I(V0, V1;Y1) + I(V0, V2;Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|V0), (22)
R0 + 2R1 < I(V0, V2;Y2) + I(V0, V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;V2|V0), (23)
2R0 + 2R1 < I(V0, V1;Y1) + I(V0, V2;Y2)− I(V1;V2|V0), (24)
Re ≤ R1,
Re < min{I(V0, V1;Y1|U)− I(V0, V1;Z|U), I(V0, V2;Y2|U)− I(V0, V2;Z|U)},
2Re < I(V0, V1;Y1|U) + I(V0, V2;Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|V0)− 2I(V0;Z|U), (25)
R0 +Re < min{I(V0, V1;Y1)− I(V1, V0;Z|U), I(V0, V2;Y2)− I(V2, V0;Z|U)},
R0 + 2Re < I(V0, V1;Y1) + I(V0, V2;Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|V0)− 2I(V0;Z|U),
R0 + 2Re < I(V0, V2;Y2) + I(V0, V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;V2|V0)− 2I(V0;Z|U),
2R0 + 2Re < I(V0, V1;Y1) + I(V0, V2;Y2)− I(V1;V2|V0)− 2I(V0;Z|U), (26)
with the constraint of I(V1, V2;Z|V0) ≤ I(V1;Z|V0)+I(V2;Z|V0)−I(V1;V2|V0) on the set of possible probability
distributions. Due to this constraint, the numbered inequalities in the above region are redundant.
We now complete the proof by using rate splitting. This is equivalent to letting R1 = R′′1 , R0 = Rn0 + R′1 in
the above region and letting the new rates be Rn0 for the common message and Rn1 = R′1 + R′′11 for the private
message. Using Fourier-Motzkin to eliminate the auxiliary rates R′1 and R′′1 then results in the following region.
R0 < I(U ;Z),
R0 +R1 < I(U ;Z) + min{I(V0, V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|V0), I(V0, V2;Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|V0)},
R0 +R1 < min{I(V0, V1;Y1)− I(V1;Z|V0), I(V0, V2;Y2)− I(V2;Z|V0)},
Re ≤ R1,
Re < min{I(V0, V1;Y1|U)− I(V0, V1;Z|U), I(V0, V2;Y2|U)− I(V0, V2;Z|U)},
R0 +Re < min{I(V0, V1;Y1)− I(V1, V0;Z|U), I(V0, V2;Y2)− I(V2, V0;Z|U)},
R0 + 2Re < I(V0, V1;Y1) + I(V0, V2;Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|V0)− 2I(V0;Z|U),
R0 + 2Re < I(V0, V2;Y2) + I(V0, V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;V2|V0)− 2I(V0;Z|U),
R0 +R1 +Re < min{I(V0, V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|V0), I(V0, V2;Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|V0)}
+min{I(V0, V1;Y1)− I(V1, V0;Z|U), I(V0, V2;Y2)− I(V2, V0;Z|U)},
R0 +R1 + 2Re < min{I(V0, V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|V0), I(V0, V2;Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|V0)}
+ I(V0, V1;Y1) + I(V0, V2;Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|V0)− 2I(V0;Z|U),
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R0 +R1 + 2Re < min{I(V0, V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|V0), I(V0, V2;Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|V0)}
+ I(V0, V2;Y2) + I(V0, V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;V2|V0)− 2I(V0;Z|U).
Eliminating redundant inequalities then results in
R0 < I(U ;Z),
R0 +R1 < I(U ;Z) + min{I(V0, V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|V0), I(V0, V2;Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|V0)},
R0 +R1 < min{I(V0, V1;Y1)− I(V1;Z|V0), I(V0, V2;Y2)− I(V2;Z|V0)},
Re ≤ R1,
Re < min{I(V0, V1;Y1|U)− I(V0, V1;Z|U), I(V0, V2;Y2|U)− I(V0, V2;Z|U)},
R0 +Re < min{I(V0, V1;Y1)− I(V1, V0;Z|U), I(V0, V2;Y2)− I(V2, V0;Z|U)},
R0 + 2Re < I(V0, V1;Y1) + I(V0, V2;Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|V0)− 2I(V0;Z|U),
R0 + 2Re < I(V0, V2;Y2) + I(V0, V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;V2|V0)− 2I(V0;Z|U),
R0 +R1 + 2Re < I(V0, V2;Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|V0) + I(V0, V1;Y1)
+ I(V0, V2;Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|V0)− 2I(V0;Z|U),
R0 +R1 + 2Re < I(V0, V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|V0) + I(V0, V2;Y2)
+ I(V0, V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;V2|V0)− 2I(V0;Z|U).
APPENDIX IV
CONVERSE FOR PROPOSITION 2
The R1 inequalities follow from a technique used in [8, Proposition 11]. We provide the proof here for
completeness.
nR1 ≤
∑
i
I(M1;Y1i|M0, Y
n
1,i+1) + nǫn
≤
∑
i
I(M1;Y1i|M0, Y
n
1,i+1, Z
i−1) +
∑
i
I(Zi−1;Y1i|M0, Y
n
1,i+1) + nǫn
(a)
≤
∑
i
I(M1, Y
n
1,i+1;Y1i|M0, Z
i−1)−
∑
i
I(Y n1,i+1;Y1i|M0, Z
i−1)
+
∑
i
I(Y n1,i+1;Zi|M0, Z
i−1) + nǫn
(b)
≤
∑
i
I(Xi;Y1i|M0, Z
i−1) + nǫn =
∑
i
I(Xi;Y1i|Ui) + nǫn,
where (a) follows by the Csisza´r sum lemma; and (b) follows by the assumption that Y1 is less noisy than Z and
the data processing inequality. The other inequality involving Y2 and Z can be shown in a similar fashion.
We now turn to the Re inequalities. The fact that Re ≤ R1 is trivial. We show the other 2 inequalities. We have
nRe ≤ I(M1;Y
n
1 |M0)− I(M1;Z
n|M0) + nǫn
=
n∑
i=1
(
I(M1;Y1i|M0, Y
n
1,i+1)− I(M1;Zi|M0, Z
i−1)
)
+ nǫn
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
(
I(M1, Z
i−1;Y1i|M0, Y
n
1,i+1)− I(M1, Y
n
1,i+1;Zi|M0, Z
i−1)
)
+ nǫn
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(b)
=
n∑
i=1
(
I(M1;Y1i|M0, Y
n
1,i+1, Z
i−1)− I(M1;Zi|M0, Z
i−1, Y n1,i+1)
)
+ nǫn
(c)
≤
n∑
i=1
(
I(M1, Y
n
1,i+1;Y1i|M0, Z
i−1)− I(M1, Y
n
1,i+1;Zi|M0, Z
i−1)
)
+ nǫn
(d)
≤
n∑
i=1
(I(Xi;Y1i|Ui)− I(Xi;Zi|Ui)) + nǫn,
where (a) and (b) follow by the Csisza´r sum lemma; (c) follows by the less noisy assumption; (d) follows by the
less noisy assumption and the fact that conditioned on (M0, Zi−1), (M1, Y ni+1) → Xi → (Y1i, Zi). The second
inequality involving I(X ;Y2|U)− I(X ;Z|U) can be proved in a similar manner. Finally, applying the independent
randomization variable Q ∼ U [1 : n], i.e. uniformly distributed over [1 : n], and defining U = (UQ, Q), X = XQ,
Y1 = Y1Q, Y2 = Y2Q and Z = ZQ then completes the proof.
APPENDIX V
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
In cases two to four, the codebook generation, encoding and decoding procedures are the same as Case 1, but
with different rate definitions. We therefore do not repeat these steps here.
Case 2: Assume that I(U3;Z3)−R0−I(U3;Z2|U) ≥ 0, I(V ;Y1|U3)−I(V ;Z2|U3) ≤ I(V ;Y1|U3)−I(V ;Z3|U3)
and Re3 ≤ I(V ;Y1|U3)− I(V ;Z2|U3).
In this case, using the definitions of the split message and randomization rates as in case 1, we see that we
can achieve Re3 = I(V ;Y1|U3) − I(V ;Z2|U3) by defining R′11 = I(V ;Y1|U3) − I(V ;Z2|U3) and R′′11 = 0. The
equivocation rate constraints now are
Ro10 +R
r
o > I(U3;Z2|U),
Rr1 +R
o
11 > I(V ;Z2|U3).
Performing Fourier-Motzkin elimination as before then yields the rate-equivocation region given in Case 2.
Case 3: Assume that I(U3;Z3)−R0−I(U3;Z2|U) ≥ 0, I(V ;Y1|U3)−I(V ;Z2|U3) ≥ I(V ;Y1|U3)−I(V ;Z3|U3)
In this case, since we consider only the case of R1 ≥ I(V ;Y1|U3) − I(V ;Z3|U3), an equivocation rate of Re3 =
I(V ;Y1|U3)− I(V ;Z3|U3) can be achieved by setting R′11 = I(V ;Y1|U3)− I(V ;Z3|U3). The constraints for this
case are as follow.
Decoding Constraints:
R0 +R
o
10 +R
r
0 +R
s
10 < I(U3;Z3),
Rs10 +R
o
10 +R
r
0 < I(U3;Y1|U),
R′11 +R
′′
11 +R
o
11 +R
r
1 < I(V ;Y1|U3).
Equivocation rate constraints:
Ro10 +R
r
o > I(U3;Z2|U),
R′′11 +R
r
1 +R
o
11 > I(V ;Z3|U3),
Rr1 +R
o
11 > I(V ;Z2|U3).
Greater than or equal to zero constraints:
Ro10, R
o
0, R
′
11, R
′′
11, R
r
1, R
r
0 ≥ 0.
Equality constraints:
R1 = R
o
10 +R
s
10 +R
′
11 +R
′′
11 + R
o
11,
Re2 = R
s
10 +R
′
11 +R
′′
11,
Re3 = R
′
11,
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R′11 = I(V ;Y1|U3)− I(V ;Z3|U3).
Performing Fourier-Motzkin elimination then results in the rate-equivocation region for Case 3.
Case 4: Assume that I(U3;Z3)−R0 − I(U3;Z2|U) ≤ 0. In this case, note that Re2 ≤ min{R1, I(V ;Y1|U3)−
I(V ;Z2|U3)} and can be achieved using only the V n layer of codewords. We set Rs10 = 0 in this case. If
I(V ;Y1|U3) − I(V ;Z2|U3) ≤ I(V ;Y1|U3) − I(V ;Z3|U3), then Re2 = I(V ;Y1|U3) − I(V ;Z2|U3) and Re3 =
min{R1, I(V ;Y1|U3)− I(V ;Z3|U3)} are achievable. If I(V ;Y1|U3)− I(V ;Z2|U3) ≥ I(V ;Y1|U3)− I(V ;Z3|U3),
then Re3 = I(V ;Y1|U3)− I(V ;Z3|U3) and Re2 = min{R1, I(V ;Y1|U3)− I(V ;Z2|U3)} are achievable.
APPENDIX VI
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
As in [8], we establish bounds for the channel from X to (Y1, Z2) and for the channel from X to (Y1, Z3).
The X to (Y1, Z2) bound: We first prove bounds on R0 and R1. Define the auxiliary random variables Ui =
(M0, Y
i−1
1 ), U3i = (M0, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
3,i+1), and Vi = (M1,M0, Zn3,i+1, Y i−11 ) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Then, following the
steps of the converse proof in [16], it is straightforward to show that
R0 ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Ui;Z2i) + ǫn,
R1 ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
(I(Vi;Y1i|Ui)) + ǫn,
where ǫn → 0 with n.
To bound Re2, first consider
H(M1|Z
n
2 )
(a)
≤ H(M1|Z
n
2 ,M0) + nǫn
(b)
= H(M1)− I(M1;Z
n
2 |M0) + nǫn
(c)
≤ I(M1;Y
n
1 |M0)− I(M1;Z
n
2 |M0) + nǫn
=
n∑
i=1
(I(M1;Y1i|M0, Y
i−1
1 )− I(M1;Z2i|M0, Z
i−1
2 )) + nǫn
(d)
≤
n∑
i=1
(I(Xi;Y1i|M0, Y
i−1
1 )− I(Xi;Z2i|M0, Z
i−1
2 )) + nǫn
=
n∑
i=1
(I(Xi;Y1i|Ui)−H(Z2i|M0, Z
i−1
2 ) +H(;Z2i|M0, Z
i−1
2 , Xi)) + nǫn
(e)
≤
n∑
i=1
(I(Xi;Y1i|Ui)−H(Z2i|M0, Z
i−1
2 , Y
i−1) +H(Z2i|M0, Z
i−1
2 , Y
i−1, Xi)) + nǫn
(f)
=
n∑
i=1
(I(Xi;Y1i|Ui)− I(Xi;Z2i|Ui)) + nǫn,
where (a) and (c) follow by Fano’s inequality, (b) follows by the independence of M1 and M0. (d), (e) and (f)
follows by degradation of the channel from X → Y1 → Z2, which implies Zi−12 → Y
i−1
1 → Xi → Y1i → Z2i
by physical degradedness. For the next inequality, we use the fact that a stochastic encoder p(xn|M0,M1) can be
treated as a deterministic mapping of (M0,M1) and an independent randomization variable W onto Xn.
nR0 + nRe2 = H(M0) +H(M1|Z
n
2 )
(a)
≤ H(M0) +H(M1|Z
n
2 ,M0) + nǫn
= I(M0;Z
n
3 ) +H(M1|M0)−H(M1|M0) +H(M1|Z
n
2 ,M0) + nǫn
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= I(M0;Z
n
3 ) + I(M1;Y
n
1 |M0)− I(M1;Z
n
2 |M0) + nǫn
(b)
≤ I(M0;Z
n
3 ) + I(M1,W ;Y
n
1 |M0)− I(M1,W ;Z
n
2 |M0) + nǫn
(c)
≤
n∑
i=1
(I(U3i;Z3i) + I(Xi;Y1i|U3i))− I(M1,W ;Z
n
2 |M0) + nǫn
(d)
≤
n∑
i=1
(I(U3i;Z3i) + I(Xi;Y1i|U3i))−
n∑
i=1
H(Z2i|M0, Y
i−1
1 )
+
n∑
i=1
H(Z2i|M1,M0,W,Z
i−1
2 ) + nǫn
(e)
=
n∑
i=1
(I(U3i;Z3i) + I(Xi;Y1i|U3i))−
n∑
i=1
H(Z2i|M0, Y
i−1
1 )
+
n∑
i=1
H(Z2i|M1,M0,W, Y
i−1
1 ) + nǫn
=
n∑
i=1
(I(U3i;Z3i) + I(Xi;Y1i|U3i))−
n∑
i=1
I(M1,W,M0;Z2i|M0, Y
i−1
1 ) + nǫn
(f)
=
n∑
i=1
(I(U3i;Z3i) + I(Xi;Y1i|U3i))−
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Z2i|M0, Y
i−1
1 ) + nǫn
=
n∑
i=1
(I(U3i;Z3i) + I(Xi;Y1i|U3i))−
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Z2i|Ui) + nǫn,
where (a) follows by Fano’s inequality and H(M0|Zn2 ) ≤ nǫn; (b) follows by degradation of the channel from
X → (Y1, Z2); (c) by Csisza´r sum applied to the first two terms (see for e.g. [2]); (d) follows by the fact that
conditioning reduces entropy; (e) follows by the Markov relation: Zi−12 → Y
i−1
1 → (M0,M1,W ) → Z2i; (f)
follows by the fact that Xi if a function of (M0,M1,W ). This chain of inequalities implies that
Re2 ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
(I(U3i;Z3i)− I(U3i;Z2i|Ui))−R0 +
1
n
n∑
i=1
(I(Xi;Y1i|U3i)− I(Xi;Z2i|U3i)) + ǫn
≤
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
(I(U3i;Z3i)− I(U3i;Z2i|Ui))−R0
]+
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
(I(Xi;Y1i|U3i)− I(Xi;Z2i|U3i)) + ǫn.
Finally, we arrive at single letter expressions by introducing the time-sharing random variable Q ∼ U [1 : n], i.e.
uniformly distributed over [1 : n], independent of (M0,M1, X, Y1, Z2, Z3,W ), and defining UQ = (M0, Y Q−11 ),
U = (UQ, Q), VQ = (M1, U, Z
n
2,Q+1), Y1 = Y1Q and Z2 = Z2Q to obtain the following bounds
R0 ≤ I(U ;Z2) + ǫn,
R1 ≤ I(V ;Y1|U) + ǫn,
Re2 ≤ (I(X ;Y1|U)− I(X ;Z2|U)) + ǫn,
Re2 ≤ [I(U3;Z3)− R0 − I(U3;Z2|U)]
+ + I(X ;Y1|U3)− I(X ;Z2|U3) + ǫn.
The X → (Y1, Z3) bound: The inequalities involving X → (Y1, Z3) follow standard converse techniques. First,
applying the proof techniques from [15], we obtain the following bounds for the rates
R0 ≤ min
{
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(U3i;Z3i),
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(U3i;Y1i)
}
+ ǫn,
R0 +R1 ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
(I(Vi;Y1i|U3i) + I(U3i;Z3i)) + ǫn.
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We now turn to the second secrecy bound,
H(M1|Z
n
3 ) ≤ H(M1,M0|Z
n
3 ) = H(M1|Z
n
3 ,M0) +H(M0|Z
n
3 )
(a)
≤ H(M1|Z
n
3 ,M0) + nǫn
(b)
≤ H(M1|Z
n
3 ,M0)−H(M1|Y
n
1 ,M0) + nǫn
= I(M1;Y
n
1 |M0)− I(M1;Z
n
3 |M0) + nǫn,
where (a) and (b) follow by Fano’s inequality. Using the Csisza´r sum lemma, we can obtain the following
H(M1|Z
n
3 ) ≤
n∑
i=1
(I(M1;Y1i|M0, Y
i−1
1 )− I(M1;Z3i|M0, Z
n
3,i+1)) + nǫn
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
(I(M1, Z
n
3,i+1;Y1i|M0, Y
i−1
1 )− I(M1, Y
i−1
1 ;Z3i|M0, Z
n
3,i+1)) + nǫn
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
(I(M1;Y1i|M0, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
3,i+1)− I(M1;Z3i|M0, Z
n
3,i+1, Y
i−1
1 )) + nǫn
=
n∑
i=1
(I(Vi;Y1i|U3i)− I(Vi;Z3i|U3i)) + nǫn,
where both (a) and (b) are obtained using the the Csisza´r sum lemma. Applying the independent randomization
variable Q ∼ U [1 : n], i.e. uniformly distributed over [1 : n], we obtain
R0 ≤ min{I(U3;Z3), I(U3;Y1)}+ ǫn,
R0 +R1 ≤ I(U3;Z3) + I(V ;Y1|U3) + ǫn,
Re3 ≤ I(V ;Y1|U3)− I(V ;Z3|U3) + ǫn,
where U3Q = (M0, Y Q−11 , Zn3,Q+1), U3 = (U3Q, Q), Y1 = Y1Q and Z3 = Z3Q. This completes the proof of the
outer bound.
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